I find this text on military reform Azaña in blog. I find it interesting reading. We must reflect on the contents of this post. Do you think it was a structural shift in openwork on previous measures such as regeneration or Canalejas Polavieja? Talk about it.
April 25, Minister Manuel Azana began its military reform with a famous decree granting passage to the second reserve position with the same salary scale enjoyed active, "all officers General Staff General, the Civil Guard and the Police and Alabarderos Corps, Military Law, Quartermaster, Intervention and Health "as well as officials of various weapons and bodies that so request. This was the cornerstone of reform and sought Azaña clearly resolve the key problem of the English army, which was the abundance of Indian leaders for so little. Once this process began Azaña army reform itself.
History Left for the names of those who advised the minister in this work: Commander of Artillery Juan Fernandez Saravia, commander of cavalry Germain Boas Roman, commander Antonio Vidal Lóriga Artillery, Infantry Commander Andrés Fuentes Perez, commander of Staff Angel Herrero Riaño; Engineers commander Enrique Escudero Cisneros, Commissioner Joseph second war Chirlanda Arms, Captain Juan Ayza Bergon Cavalry, Captain Pedro Romero Rodríguez Artillery, and Captain Quartermaster Ordiales Elviro Oroz.
These eleven men do not know if mercilessly (counting Azaña) conducted a pruning in the structure of the English army to be noted as spectacular. Its aim was to modernize the structure of the armed forces and bring them to a reasonable proportion of approximately one hundred military civilians.
Consequently, the country was divided into eight functional divisions and established the endowment that would have, in each case was:
- 2 infantry brigades, each consisting of two regiments, also consisting of two battalions, and having each battalion 4 rifle companies, a machine gun and a section of specialists.
- 1 squadron of cavalry, a section of machine guns and infantry another rider.
- 1 light artillery brigade.
- 1 battalion of sappers, miners.
- 1 group of transmissions.
- 1 lighting section.
- 1 aviation squadron.
- 1 unit of ballooning.
- 1 divisional park for ammunition, weapons and equipment.
- 1 divisional quartermaster group, with a mounted company of provisions, a bakery company car and two utility companies.
- 1 group divisional health, with a section of ambulances, a column of evacuation and a group of disinfection.
- 1 evacuation mobile veterinary section.
addition to this structure, as it were, by default, there were more independent units, and two mixed brigades of mountain infantry, 2 light trucks regiments of combat, 7 more infantry regiments, 1 cavalry division, 4 artillery regiments, 4 coast artillery regiments, 3 artillery mixed groups, 2 groups defense against aircraft, 4 parks corps artillery, 1 regiment of sappers, miners, 1 Central Park racing, 1 pontoon battalion, 1 regiment of railroads, 2 mixed independent groups of sappers and telegraphs in the Balearic Islands, two in Canary trails Housekeeping and sanitation companies in both islands, a regiment of ballooning, 3 sets of information 1 tank artillery and livestock.
seems much and probably it is in the eyes of many people who feel peace. It is interesting to remember because, apart from the truth thus claimed, also comes in handy because sometimes, in between romantic views and interests of the Republic, wants to see reform Azaña something like a dismantling of the army, promoted for alleged anti-military ideas of the minister who later became prime minister and then president.
To the chagrin of some of their sacred writers and / or admirers, ana was far from what today we would consider a pacifist. Was that Yes, a person obsessed with the military budget to be spent well, ie not give a penny more than necessary, but not a penny less. His words where they should act, this is in the parliament building, are these:
The army in Spain is not better or worse than the University, or civil engineers, or the University, or any other institution. What happens is that within the functioning of the state, the military and therefore the costs involved, or are perfect or are sterile, there is no middle ground. And for the Army carárter contentious. The Army, in peacetime, has no mission instuirse for war, but when war comes, if the organization of the army is not as perfect as it is in the human, good for nothing, and everything has been spending and producing and working in the years of peace is absolutely lost, this does not happen in any other state institution.
not appear that a person who declares that his desire is an army everything perfect fit in the human not be considered a pacifist, and advocate of disarmament, not an enemy of the legal monopoly of violence.
That's right. The long list of units that made up the army of the Republic should not hide the forest of considerable thinning of it. Ana and his advisers eliminated 37 infantry regiments, four battalions of mountain, nine battalions of hunters, 17 regiments of cavalry, a regiment of railways and two battalions of engineers. A decree of June 16 reorganizes the military areas and removes the categories of general and lieutenant captain general (Franco rose and, as I know, are resurrected) and then took a series of measures, including perhaps the most widely known is the decision to close the Military Academy of Zaragoza, which was then headed by General Franco.
The ten soldiers who have cited the so-called Military Cabinet were known in many quarters of flags of that time as Black Cabinet. Emilio Mola, the general who would rise to 36 from Franco in Pamplona, \u200b\u200bis the source that has left more writings by, so to speak, opposition to reform. According to this version, Black Cabinet main function was to define who should be up and access in each case to command the troops. It is, as I say, the version of Mola, but it is difficult to believe in the light of events unless the advisers presuppose Azaña total ignorance of lameness ideological peers to those who reached or maintained.
The authors of the eulogies Franco after the war, as Arrarás mutilation speak bluntly referring to measures ana. However, about six months into the reform, ana could go to court and boast that the opposition had been petty, and not lying. However, there is little evidence that what really happened is that the military had been, after the proclamation of the Republic, in a state of uncertainty which prevented them from organizing and react. The truth is that eventually the facts show that there were few of them who were radically opposed to the reform and, in fact, those few soldiers who were also members (for Fernández Castillejo Tomás Joaquín Fanjul or Peire) fought several projects Azaña everything they could. It was not the only ones who fought for reform. So did the right employer, which rejected a measure of reform: the creation of the Consortium of Military Industrialization, which was considered unfair competition against private industry. Encompassed the Consortium National de Toledo Factory, Ordnance Factory of Seville, the Explosives Factory of Granada, Murcia Gunpowder Factory, Small Arms Factory in Oviedo and Trubia factory guns. It was disbanded in 1935, during the biennium of Rights. If
advanced in reading who opined on these reforms, we find that do not question its primary source. Mola general himself, for example, admits that, after the war in Morocco (Al Hoceima after landing, according to one newspaper, was carried by 10,000 English French national ) "not only the professional officers was excessive, but also the army itself was too permanent war machine for the needs of the nation. " However, if we consider a military spokesman Mola (or at least of certain soldiers, who were few in the quarter-flags) the reduction was excessive. Mola estimated in 1933 that meaning that in case of mobilization (ie, if the situation fell apart peace) would require more than 4,000 officers who had left ana, and I must say at this point seems he was right, since, once started the civil war, it is obvious that the Republican army officer was addled (and improvised from the militants of political parties and trade unions), and in the Franco side, more gifted, still had to "pull" of the Falange, the the Requetes and bodies as temporary lieutenants. And this was despite the army had disposed of between 10,000 and 12,000 military. Another
elements of reform Azana was, evidently, unforgivable by the military coup would be one day, was the rationalization of the promotion. Feat was clear that the core of the opposition from the army was in the African units, and if any doubt was left in August 1932 the dissipated when she saw that General Sanjurjo, hero of Al Hoceima, he mounted a coup. So, within the two main camps of the English armed forces, ie escalafonófilos [this word I invented for me not to call them ranker] and African , opted for the former and, in the words of Mola made the military they were accustomed to rise by merit of war "set the pace in the ranks for all eternity."
Azaña's diary entry is a 1933 that is very telling of the damage done to African this measure and that is also very symptomatic in the light of subsequent events. Ana says:
I received in the Ministry of General Vera, who commands the Eighth Division. He says that General Franco is very angry with me for the review of promotion. Making the number one brigadier general has become the twenty-four. It's the least that could have happened. I thought for some time yet descend more.
To make matters worse, this measure was supplemented by a law of March 9, 1932, with which, in my opinion, ana finally sign their divorce with the military.
Thanks to this law, members of the General Staff of the Army could be placed on active reserve status by government decree if: took more than six months in secret, available, and during that time had provided a destination for for its category. What does this mean? Well come to mean that, after passing the reserve volunteers in 1931, now the government is appealing the right to move to the reservation to officers, he was owner of the pass and also the conditions that made it possible. Ie: for out of the way to a soldier, had only to have it six months by corridors.
In short, or at least, my short, in fact, many of the problems of the Republic that became apparent in the coup of July 18, 1936 were there from the beginning, and beyond. The military problem is one of them. Such as land reform, military reform seems to me an example of a well-intentioned and well as focused (as I wrote, even the most entrenched enemies and reform Azaña dare not question the basis of it) but errónea en sus plazos. Un ministro de defensa socialista, Narcís Serra, haría, medio siglo después, cosas relativamente parecidas (al menos en lo que se refiere a los pases voluntarios a la reserva), pero midiendo los tiempos considerabilísimamente mejor que don Manuel, a quien muchos tienen por político genial pero yo reputo un poco excesivamente pagado de sí mismo, lo cual equivale a decir que le costaba admitir y admitirse que tal vez estaba equivocado tomando tal o cual medida.
Igual que el orden público, igual que la defección revolucionaria a izquierda y derecha del sistema, el problema militar se mostró prácticamente desde el primer momento de existencia de la República, y ya no le abandonó. The Republic, through such deep reforms that started to realize just one week after being proclaimed, he earned the opposition of masses of soldiers, and never fully recovered his affection, indeed, to have armed forces nearby, had to improvise some security forces, especially the guards of assault, which were similar.
Azaña military reform, however, was made to build a modern army. When you read criticism of Mola can not help but notice them feel pregnant with a whiff of old and corporatist. Mola Azaña charge against sectarian considering it, even in part might be right in doing so ignores the fundamental principle that an army is not its own reality which is governed by its own rules, but an institution in the service of constitutional legality. In general that the coup finally, despite the bitter words he devoted to the defense together, is to apply precisely the vision of the things that they advocated: let the military to resolve the issues of the military.
Azaña
But he was wrong. In this as in so many ways, wanted to boil the frog alive by casting a pot of boiling water. And when it comes to leadership, everyone knows that the only way to boil a live frog is put it in a pot of cold water, put the pot on a fire very very soft, and then go very slowly uploading. The big flaw in this flawed policy was to consider that to be right before history, the obstacles were to step aside. In fact, it is just the opposite: the more reason gives us the history, the harder it is to do what we want.
Azaña finally made a mistake. Not him only, but all republican governments, almost without exception. I've said before that the proportion sought was the logic for any country, ie a hundred military civilians. But that is the case in countries where civilians are unarmed and / or are not using these weapons to subvert the order. To Emilio Castelar, who was president of the First English Republic, he was asked, shortly after the failure of that trial and the return of the monarchy, if it remained Republican. He replied: Yes Republic, yes; Republic forever. But with more military, more Marina, with over Civil Guard.
Basically, rationalization, ie thinning, a royal army, class and used to intervene in politics, all without trauma or fighting, it would have been possible if the army had been dominated by subversion. Far from it, the Republic was weak and fickle against such subversion of both the left when they ruled, as of right when they came to a command. In Spain from 1931 to 1933 and 1936, the violent opposition CNT was not attacked with the full weight of the law in Spain during the biennium to the right, the far right flourished free of obstacles, which may be thought that delighted the military, but it is not since she has to radicalize the nurseries of leftists in the military, mostly concentrated in the body of Assault. To put it very simply, we can say, we say that the army's involvement in the political destiny of Spain was then what would now: if this despicable, but it was not surprising, because any military coup found the perfect excuse to put tanks on the street in a country where impunity private buildings were burned by rioters without the moving forces a finger, and that was when the Republic had not a month.
And the principal defender of it were so, so that non-act was, in fact, the minister Don Manuel ana. Feat, which took a lot of power in those Republican administrations, skidded too many times on the same curve: the burning of convents, in the weeks immediately preceding Casas Viejas and 36, in the escalation of events culminate with the murder of Calvo-Sotelo. Under these conditions, its military reform, which could be described on paper, to me it seems, but good shot, they proved unable to avoid, once again, the divorce between the military and the people they belong.
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